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  The corporate approach to environmental protection has been evolving from a regulation-
driven reactive mode to a more proactive approach involving an internally motivated 
organizational change in corporate culture and management practices towards environmental 
self-regulation. A growing number of firms are taking a strategic view towards environmental 
management and adopting environmental management practices (EMPs) that establish formal 
procedures and organizational routines that can help to achieve environmental goals. These 
practices represent internal efforts at establishing environmental policies and goals, setting 
environmental standards for suppliers, training employees, undertaking environmental auditing 
and environmental cost accounting and publishing environmental information in reports made 
available to the public. Many firms are also taking a holistic view of pollution control and 
treating it as synonymous with minimizing waste streams associated with the design, 
manufacture, use and disposal of products and materials. Such firms are modifying processes and 
products, substituting raw materials and recycling waste products to reduce end-of-pipe disposal. 
We refer to such activities as pollution prevention or P2 activities.  
Both the adoption of EMPs and P2 activities are forms of environmental management 
and both represent effort rather than actual environmental performance outcomes. However, P2 
activities may require a greater degree of integration of environmental concerns in the 
operational decisions of the firm and efforts that may mitigate a firm’s impact on the 
environment more directly. 
Adoption of EMPs and P2 activities is voluntary since there are no regulations mandating 
their adoption. Firms have considerable flexibility in the EMPs and/or P2 activities they adopt 
and the degree to which each is implemented within the organization. The motivations for firms   2
to adopt EMPs might be quite different from their motivations to undertake P2 activities. Many 
firms face external demands for adopting EMPs from trade associations, customers and agencies. 
They face two separate decisions: whether to adopt EMPs and how intensively to invest in 
improving environmental performance. Depending on their motivations for adopting EMPs, the 
decision to adopt them may or may not be linked to a decision to invest in environmental 
performance improvement. Some firms may see environmental practices as being marginal to 
their strategic and competitive objectives and adopt EMPs simply to provide an appearance of 
conformity, to demonstrate commitment to the environment and attain legitimacy with 
stakeholders treat EMPs. Such firms may adopt EMPs as a symbolic tool to manipulate their 
external image but not as being important for internal change in strategies to improve 
environmental performance (Nash and Ehrenfield, 2001; Delmas and Toffel, 2005). Other firms 
may have stronger commitments to the environment and may be more likely to make 
investments in pollution prevention activities.  
What motivates firms to voluntarily adopt EMPs and P2 activities? Are the same types of 
firms likely to adopt both to a greater extent than others? What is the role of external 
stakeholders vs. internal factors and managerial attitudes in determining the extent to which 
firms adopt EMPs and P2 activities? This paper seeks to understand the extent to which there are 
differential incentives that motivate the adoption of EMPs and P2 practices. In particular, we 
seek to analyze the role of internal drivers such as managerial attitudes towards the environment 
and external factors in shaping incentives to adopt EMPs and P2 practices. Our analysis is based 
on survey-based information on a variety of EMPs and P2 activities adopted by 689 facilities 
located in Oregon in 2005 and operating in six different sectors. We also examine the relative 
importance of perceived (subjective) incentives for environmental management and those of 
objective incentives captured by observable facility characteristics such as ownership, size, and   3
type of product produced. We use information on reported intensity of adoption of EMPs and P2 
activities to construct an index for each that measures the extent to which EMPs and P2 is being 
implemented within the facility.  We implement this research using a combination of 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and a structural equation model (SEM) We focus this 
analysis on facilities located in Oregon where public and private initiatives to foster improved 
business environmental management have proliferated since the 1990s.
1 Of the facilities 
responding more than half had implemented at least one environmental management practice. 
The respondents include small facilities and those under private ownership. The empirical 
analysis uses a two-stage process in which the measurement models are first developed and 
confirmed using confirmatory factor analysis to obtain latent constructs of EMPs and P2 
activities and of perceived pressures from various stakeholders. In the second stage the 
measurement model and the SEM are estimated jointly to examine the determinants of EMPs and 
P2 activities using path analysis. Our reliance on a SEM instead of standard regression analysis 
recognizes that perceived pressures are not a predetermined exogenous variable and that the 
measure of pressure does not have a cardinal interpretation that is comparable across firms.  
Several studies have empirically examined the factors that motivate some firms to 
voluntarily adopt one or more environmental management practices or to seek ISO 14001 
certification using observable characteristics of firms to serve as objective measures of external 
                                                 
1 The Oregon Legislature created a Green Permits Program (http://www.deq.state.or.us/programs/greenpermits) in 
1999 to achieve environmental results that are significantly better than those required by law.  In January 2007, 
business and government leaders endorsed sustainable business as a core element of the state’s economic 
development strategy (http://www.oregonbusinessplan.org/). The City of Portland, Oregon has a ‘green buildings’ 
program to promote cost-effective solutions that lessen environmental impacts of commercial buildings 
(http://www.green-rated.org/).  Private sector (for-profit and non-profit) examples include the emergence of business 
sustainability consulting firms (e.g., http://www.brightworks.net/, the Forest Stewardship Council’s certification 
program (http://fscus.org/), the Food Alliance certification system (http://www.thefoodalliance.org), and the Oregon 
Natural Step chapter (http://www.ortns.org/).     4
regulatory and market pressures
 2. These studies show the importance of regulatory pressures 
(Anton et al., 2004; Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Arimura et al., 2007) in motivating the adoption 
of EMPs or the ISO 14001 standard. Firms that were larger in size (Dasgupta et al., 2000) and 
those producing final goods, particularly if they were small polluters, were also more likely to 
adopt more EMPs (Anton et al., 2004). A few studies, such as, Henriques and Sadorsky (1996), 
Delmas and Toffel (2004) and Nakamura et al (2001) include both observable proxies and 
constructed measures of perceived pressures to explain adoption of EMPs and ISO 14001 
standard, respectively. Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) find that customer pressure, shareholder 
pressure, regulatory pressure and community pressures and lower sales-to-asset ratio motivates 
firms to adopt an environmental plan.
3 Delmas and Toffel (2004) construct three broad groups of 
pressures (commercial, non-market and internal)
4 faced by firms. They find that perceived 
pressures, particularly commercial pressures and internal pressures, have a stronger role in 
explaining adoption of EMPs than objective pressures. Similarly Nakamura et al (2001) find that 
environmental values, beliefs and attitudes of managers are important in addition to observable 
proxies for costs and benefits of ISO certification. Banerjee et al. (2003) find that regulatory 
pressures and public concern were strong determinants of top management commitment to the 
environment which together with environmental orientation of the firm are significant 
determinants of its environmental corporate strategy.  
                                                 
2 This includes studies examining motivations for adopting a practice, such as total quality environmental 
management (Harrington et al., forthcoming), an environmental plan (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996), a firm-
structured system of environmental management practices (Khanna and Anton, 2002; Anton et al., 2004; Dasgupta 
et al., 2000; Delmas and Toffel, 2004). Studies examining the motivations for seeking ISO 14001  certification 
include Potoski and Prakash (2005), Nakamura and Takahashi (2001) and Arimura et al. (2007). 
3 However, this study includes an indicator variable, provided by survey respondents, directly as a latent variable 
instead of determining the latter using factor analysis based on several indicators of the same latent pressure. This 
implies that they are assuming the indicator variables do not include any measurement errors. 
4 Commercial pressures include those from competitors, customers, suppliers, trade assosciations and SRI funds. 
Non-market pressures include those from media, environmental organizations, local community and regulators. 
Internal pressures include those from corporate management, other facilities in the firm, employees and 
shareholders).   5
Only a few studies examine the motivations for adopting environmentally responsible 
manufacturing practices (Curkovic et al., 2000) and pollution prevention activities (Cordano and 
Frieze, 2000). The former study shows the influence of total quality management systems while 
the latter study finds that managerial attitudes and other social psychological factors strongly 
influence the preferences of mangers for source reduction activities.  
   This paper makes several contributions to this literature. Like the latter set of studies it 
includes both objective and constructed measures of perceived pressures and measures of 
managers and parent company attitudes towards the environment. The objective measures 
assume that all firms with a particular characteristic face the same pressures (for e.g that all 
facilities that sell final products face the same intensity of consumer pressure) and that the 
influence of this measure (e.g. being a final producer) on adoption is the same for all facilities. 
This does not capture the full extent of the heterogeneity among these facilities in the extent to 
which stakeholder pressures influence environmental management in their facilities because 
different corporate managers may interpret similar demands from these stakeholders differently. 
Moreover, the intensity of the demands perceived to be placed on the firm is not necessarily 
independently determined but developed interactively and open to negotiation between firm 
managers and external stakeholders; it is therefore firm-specific (Gunningham et al., 2003). We 
also use perceived measures of environmental behavior instead of objective measures since the 
former may provide more realistic assessments, based on manager perceptions, of the extent to 
which their facility is implementing EMPs and P2 activities for pollution control. 
  This framework is used to examine the motivations for the adoption of EMPs and P2 
activities using a diverse set of indicators of adoption. It also considers pressures from a highly 
disaggregated set of stakeholders, thereby providing insights on specific pressures that are 
important. Moreover, it examines the effects of managerial attitudes while controlling for the   6
effects of these other stakeholder pressures. Identification of these relationships can contribute to 
understanding of the factors that are likely to lead firms to adopt both EMPs and P2 activities 
and to the design of more effective policies to promote beyond compliance behavior.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
There are several theories that have been put forward to explain why firms voluntarily 
undertake actions to improve their environmental performance beyond compliance. Viewing the 
firm as a rational actor, environmental economists have suggested that firms may see it as being 
in their self interest to voluntary, because it could enable firms to influence markets for their 
products, obtain higher prices for their products, and lower their costs of labor and capital and 
the costs of environmental regulations (Khanna, 2001).
5 This literature suggests that the potential 
to preempt the threat of mandatory regulations, shape future regulations, gain competitive 
advantage and market share (by appealing to consumers and lowering costs and improving 
internal efficiency), build a corporate reputation with communities and environmental interest 
groups and lower the costs of capital by reducing risks of liabilities for lenders and stockholders 
can provide economic incentives for firms to voluntarily invest in environmental measures. 
Differences in adoption of EMPs can then be explained by differences in the extent to which 
individual firms expect to achieve these benefits and in the costs of adoption they have to incur, 
assuming they have perfect information on both.  The underlying premise of economic models 
explaining corporate environmental behavior is that firms are profit maximizers; thus preferences 
of the management for the environment and their moral beliefs and desire to be environmentally 
responsible are typically not incorporated in these models. 
                                                 
5 This is in contrast to the more traditional view in environmental economics of a firm as being a competitive price 
taker in the output and input markets and maximizing profits while reacting passively to regulatory constraints. 
Environmental actions in this framework impose costs and divert productive resources, consequently firms have no 
incentive to go beyond compliance with the regulatory constraints they face (see Cropper and Oates, 1992).   7
The “new institutionalistic” theories of organizational behavior broaden the view of the 
firm from a rational actor influenced by objective economic costs and benefits to being 
influenced by complex motivations stemming from normative beliefs, desire for conformity, 
political and cultural values Institutional theorists go beyond the debate between “rational” 
models on the one hand and “ normative” or “moral” models on the other to describe how 
rational, normative and cognitive decision processes can coexist (Suchman and Edelman, 
1996).They view organizations as complex social actors whose behavior is shaped as much by 
their cultural environments as by rational calculations. By emphasizing the power of cultural 
systems to shape managerial behaviors these theorists recognize that organizations may respond 
to social and moral norms and legitimacy, even when the threat of legal sanctions is remote. This 
literature, however, has been critiqued for placing too much emphasis on the homogeneity of 
organizations and not explaining the diversity in observed organizational response to similar 
institutional pressures (see Hoffman, 2001).  
Heterogeneity in organizational response to institutional pressures could be due to 
internal forces within the firm that cause inertia or cultural barriers to change (Hoffman, 2001) 
and managerial attitudes towards environmental responsibility (Gunningham et al., 2003)
6. 
Several case studies of firms suggest that managers’ attitudes and commitment play an important 
role in filtering, interpreting and prioritizing the signals they receive from the external 
environment and in facilitating or impeding proactive environmental management (Nash, 2000). 
Cordano and Frieze (2000) find that managerial knowledge and attitudes towards environment 
were key determinants of their preference for P2 activities. 
 
                                                 
6In an indepth study of paper and pulp mills in the US, Gunninghan et al. (2003) find that two mills subject to the 
same external pressures responded differently due to differences in managerial attitudes or environmental 
management style
6 and this strongly influenced their environmental performance.   8
We develop an empirical framework that recognizes that complex interactions between 
the institutional environment, organizational dynamics and managerial attitudes shape 
organizational behavior. Traditionally, firms were expected to undertake environmental 
protection only to the extent that they were coerced to do so by regulatory constraints or by 
citizen actions, such as private lawsuits or boycotts. Increasing concerns for environmental 
quality among consumers, investors, lenders, competitor firms and communities have created a 
more diverse cultural setting which induces firms to view environmental protection as being 
central to the core objectives of the firm and not as being external to the market environment 
(Hoffman, 2001). We seek to measure the effects of this expanding field of environmental 
pressures on two constructed measures of environmental behavior of a facility, extent of 
Implementation of EMPs and P2 Practices. The former is measured using information provided 
by survey respondents about the extent to which environmental goals, policies, standards and a 
variety of other practices are implemented in the facility. These include environmental audits, 
environmental cost accounting, employee training in environmental management and 
compensation for contributions to environmental performance.  The latter is measured by extent 
to which respondents perceived that pollution prevention practices, raw material substitution and 
recycling were practiced at their facility. Specific survey questions included to elicit this 
information are reported in Table 1.  
We postulate that each of these dependent variables is influenced by a combination of 
internal and external variables as in Roome (1992) and Gunningham et al. (2003). The external 
variables include demands of external stakeholders of the firm, such as, regulators, consumers, 
interest groups and investors as well as observed characteristics of facilities that proxy for the 
types of pressures they might face. The internal variables include observed measures of the 
technical capacity of the firm, organizational resources to undertake innovative management as   9
well as constructed measures of the attitudes of the managers of the facility and of the parent 
company towards the environment and perceived barriers to implementation. Thus the external 
and internal variables considered here could have a direct influence on P2 Practices as well as 
induce more intensive Implementation of EMPs.  
 
Motivations for Implementation of EMPs and P2 Practices 
Firms may voluntarily adopt EMPs and P2 practices to achieve compliance with existing 
and anticipated regulations more cost-effectively by identifying innovative approaches to 
improve environmental performance by integrating it with operational decisions as well as by 
reducing the likelihood of inspections and enforcement actions. Firms may also seek to preempt 
and shape future regulations by showing environmental stewardship and good faith efforts at 
improving environmental performance (see survey in Khanna, 2001). Regulatory pressures have 
been found to be an important motivator of voluntary environmental management by a number 
of studies and surveys of firms, notably Henriques and Sadorsky (1996), Dasgupta et al. (2000), 
Potoski and Prakash (2005), Florida and Davison (2001).  Additionally, the threat of potential 
liability for Superfund sites and anticipated Clean Air Act regulations for hazardous air 
pollutants also motivated firms to adopt more comprehensive environmental management system  
(Khanna and Anton, 2002; Anton et al., 2004). On the other hand, several studies find that 
regulatory pressures were not important for influencing certain practices (e.g. Total Quality 
Environmental Management (Harrington et al., forthcoming) or in some industries (e.g. pulp 
mills (Kagan et al. 2003). We include a latent construct Regulatory Pressures based on indicator 
variables listed in Table 2.  
 Facilities may also implement EMPs and/or P2 practices to realize market opportunities 
through their interactions with external stakeholders, such as consumers and investors, with   10
which firms have contractual relationships, as well as with communities and environmental 
interest groups that enforce the firm’s “social license to operate” (Gunningham et al., 2003). 
Consumers, stockholders and other investors can influence firm behavior by signals transmitted 
through product and capital markets. Facilities may also undertake environmental management 
and P2 to build reputational capital by showing good faith efforts at improving environmental 
performance and being accepted by local communities and interest groups.   
Among the few studies examining the influence of investors in motivating corporate 
environmental behavior among publicly traded firms, Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) find that 
pressure from shareholders was significant in motivating firms to adopt an environmental plan 
while Khanna and Anton (2002) find that publicly traded firms with a higher ratio of capital 
assets per unit sales and therefore more dependent on capital markets were more likely to adopt a 
more comprehensive environmental management system. We include a latent variable that 
measures Investor Pressure (see Table 2) and a dummy variable, Public equal to 1 if the firm 
was publicly owned. Publicly owned firms may be more likely to face pressure from diverse 
stockholders to be environmentally responsible and less risky. They may also have lower costs of 
adopting EMPs and P2 practices because they have greater access to financial resources and 
economies of scale since they are typically part of a multifacility operation. They are also more 
likely to be willing to bear risks since costs of bearing risks are spread over many investors. A 
detailed study of costs of adopting EMPs finds this to be the case (Darnall and Edwards, 2006).  
  Empirical evidence of the effect of green consumers on incentives for corporate 
environmental management is mixed. While consumer surveys indicate that consumers are 
willing to pay more for products with environmentally friendly attributes, revealed behavior in 
the market indicates that this willingness to pay is very small. Firms in closer contact with 
consumers, or spending more on advertising per unit sales or more visible to the public were   11
found to be more likely to undertake some voluntary environmental initiatives (Khanna and 
Anton, 2002; Anton et al., 2004; King and Lenox, 2000). However, both Harrington et al. 
(forthcoming) and Anderson et al. (1999) find that neither regulatory nor consumer pressures 
played a significant role in motivating the adoption of Total Quality Environmental Management 
or the ISO 9000 standard. Khanna et al. (2006) also find that market pressures from consumers, 
environmental groups and communities had an insignificant effect on P2 activities of firms.  We 
construct a latent variable as a proxy for Consumer Pressure. We also include a dummy, Retail, 
equal to one if the facility sells its output to final consumers. Communities and environmental 
interest groups demand social responsibility from firms and can affect a firm’s image and 
reputation through boycotts and negative publicity. Surveys suggest that firms that perceive these 
pressures and have a stronger desire to improve their relations with their communities and seek 
external recognition are more likely to adopt EMPs and P2 practices (Henriques and Sadorsky, 
1996; Florida and Davison, 2001; Coglianese and Nash, 2006). We include a latent variable, 
Interest Group Pressure to capture these pressures.  
  A few studies have examined whether firms in more competitive business environments 
were more likely to participate in voluntary programs in order to gain a competitive advantage 
by differentiating their product, or by lowering waste (pollution) and enhancing efficiency. 
Khanna and Anton (2002) find that firms operating in less concentrated industries, that is under 
more competitive conditions, are more likely to adopt a more comprehensive environmental 
management system. This could suggest that such firms are seeking to lessen competition by 
differentiating their products through their environmental attributes and by acquiring a credible 
environmental reputation. Dasgupta et al. (2000), on the other hand, did not find that a desire for 
international competitiveness, proxied by export orientation or multinational status, was a 
significant motivator for Mexican firms to adopt ISO 14001 while Harrington et. al   12
(forthcoming) did not find any effect of market structure on adoption of total quality 
environmental management. We include two variables to capture the market environment of the 
facility. First we construct a latent variable, Competitive Pressure to capture the facility’s 
perceptions of the extent to which it influences environmental management. We also include the 
a dummy variable, Multinational, equal to one if the facility was part of a multinational parent 
company and thus exposed to global competition. 
Some studies have also investigated the role of internal factors such as managerial 
attitudes towards the environment in motivating environmental management. Following Ajzen’s 
(1985) theory of planned behavior to examine preferences for P2, Cordano and Frieze (2000) 
suggest that “attitudes towards a behavior arise from a person’s beliefs about the consequences 
resulting from its performance and that person’s affective response to those consequences.” As a 
person’s attitudes towards a behavior become more favorable, their intention and effort exerted 
to perform the behavior is likely to increase. These attitudes might be affected by beliefs about 
the benefits and costs of voluntary environmental management. They find that managerial 
attitudes influenced preferences for source reduction activities. 
  Coglianese and Nash (2006) find that facilities that had greater support from top 
management within the facility and from the parent company for participation in the National 
Performance Track program were more likely to do it. Nakamura et al., (2001) found that 
perceptions of managers’ recognition of personal responsibility to protect the environment had a 
strong influence on the extent to which environmental policies were integrated into corporate 
policies and practices while Delmas and Toffel (2004) found that internal pressures from 
management, other facilities in the firm, employees and shareholders were important in 
determining the comprehensiveness of the environmental management system adopted.  We 
include a latent variable, Managerial Attitude, to capture these effects.    13
The availability of proven techniques for waste reduction and improved environmental 
management and pressures from stakeholders to adopt them do not guarantee that the will be 
adopted. While the above factors capture the benefits of environmental management, it is also 
important to consider the barriers to improving environmental performance, which might provide 
disincentives for adoption of EMPs and for undertaking P2 activities. Ashford (1992) identifies 
several barriers to adoption of waste reduction measures that include: lack of information about 
their impacts on future profitability, lack of managerial capacity and capital to incur transition 
costs of reorganizing production, uncertainty about the performance of new technologies. We 
construct a latent variable Barriers to Implementation, to capture these disincentives for adopting 
EMPs and/or P2 practices. The indicator responses from the survey used to construct each of 
these latent variables are described in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Data 
  The data were obtained from a survey of for-profit facilities that employed 10 or more 
employees and workers in primarily in one of the following six industry sectors in Oregon in 
2004.  These sectors include: Construction of Buildings (NAICS 236), Food Manufacturing 
(NAICS 311), Wood Product Manufacturing (NAICS 321), Computer and Electronic Product 
Manufacturing (NAICS 334), Truck Transportation (NAICS 484), and Accommodation (NAICS 
721)
 7. Names of all facilities in these sectors were obtained from the Oregon Employment 
Department (OED)
8. A total of 1,964 facilities meeting the size and sector criteria were identified 
                                                 
7 The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), replaces the earlier Standard Industry Classification 
(SIC) system. NAICS codes contain up to six digits; however, sectors were defined at the 3-digit level to obtain 
adequate sample sizes in each sector.  
8 The choice of industry sectors was based on careful consideration of several factors. This study was intended to 
provide a comprehensive view of business environmental management among facilities of varying sizes, 
characterized by a variety of organizational characteristics and voluntary environmental management approaches, 
and subject to varying environmental regulations. The selected sectors were chosen to capture both manufacturing   14
to receive the survey after telephone contacts to identify the person with the most knowledge 
about facility environmental management. The survey was developed and administered using a 
Tailored Design Method (TDM) protocol (Dillman, 2000).  The survey asked questions in four 
general areas: environmental management, environmental practices, environmental performance, 
and facility characteristics (e.g. annual revenues). The Likert agreement scale was used to assess 
perceptions of upper management and parent company attitudes, the extent to which 
environmental management practices and P2 activities have been implemented (see Appendix 
1)
9. The Likert-type ordered-response scale was used to assess perceptions of customer, investor, 
lender, regulatory and competitive influences, barriers to environmental management, 
managerial attitudes and parent company support.  
  Approximately 3.9% of eligible facilities declined to participate after the phone call. The 
facilities that declined had slightly smaller numbers of employees on average, 16 employees as 
compared to 24 for respondents. A total of 689 responses were obtained, representing an overall 
response rate of just over 35%. To test for potential self-selection bias, the OED list of facilities, 
the sample of 1,964 facilities identified to receive the survey, and the set of respondents were 
compared by facility size and geographic location. No bias was detected based on average or 
median employment levels, or proportions of facilities located in each county, between these 
groups. Additionally, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality operates three 
                                                                                                                                                             
and non-manufacturing industries of importance to the Oregon economy, in sufficient numbers to facilitate sector- 
specific analysis.  The six sectors included in this study are among those that employ the greatest numbers of 
individuals, that operate the greatest numbers of facilities, and that generate the most substantial corporate tax 
revenues in Oregon (ORS 2005, DOR 2004, USCB 2003). 
9 A 5-point scale was chosen for this study for several reasons, based on determinations by Clark (1995) and 
Lehman and Hulbert (1972). First, the 5-point scale has been found to be approximately as effective as a continuous 
scale at estimating the mean response. With the addition of each point, the differences between continuous and 
discrete scales decrease rapidly up to the level where five or six points are included. After this, adding points results 
in less measurement improvement. Furthermore, due to the length and intensity of this survey, a 7-point scale was 
considered too detailed for respondents. Conversely, a 3-point scale was considered too limited. Fewer points on the 
scale may not capture adequate variation, which increases the likelihood of a departure from the assumption of a 
normal distribution, a requirement for many statistical tests (Jacoby 1971). 
   15
geographic regulatory regions. No bias was detected based on comparisons of proportions of 
facilities located in these regions in the OED list, the survey sample, or the set of respondents. 
  Two follow-up mailings were sent to facilities that had not yet responded.  A total of 403 
facilities responded to the initial mailing, 151 facilities responded after the second mailing, and 
75 facilities responded after the third and final mailing.  To determine if the responses were 
biased according to mailing wave, we conducted a one-way analysis of variance with each of the 
survey questions as the response variable and mailing wave (first, second, or third) as the factor 
variable.   The means of the survey responses across mailing waves were found to be different 
for only three survey questions (out of 49 tested).  In those three cases these differences where 
very small in magnitude. We therefore conclude that the responses are not biased according to 
when the survey was returned 
10. 
  Estimation and testing in SEM’s assumes that the observed (or indicator) variables are 
distributed multivariate normal and are continuous. West et al (1995) explain that if multivariate 
normality is violated, then maximum likelihood estimation may produce χ2 goodness-of-fit 
statistics that are inflated (i.e., reject too many true models) and biased standard errors for 
estimated parameters (i.e., too many significant results).  Categorical variables can cause 
estimated goodness-of-fit statistics, parameter estimates, and standard errors to be biased.  We 
find that our data violate these two assumptions.   
To assess normality, we apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to each of our observed 
indicator variables.  We reject the null hypothesis that each variable is distributed univariate 
normal.  If any of the observed variables differ greatly from univariate normality, then the 
multivariate distribution cannot be normal.  We therefore conclude that our sample violates the 
                                                 
10 Our ANOVA results indicated that there were differences in some facility characteristics across mailing waves.  
For example, the average facility revenue in surveys returned after the second mailing wave was higher.  These 
differences do not appear to be systematic.    16
assumption of multivariate normality.   Our survey responses are measured using a five-point 
scale, another potential source of bias.  West et al (1995) report, however, that the bias may be 
small when the number of categories for each observed variables is large enough.  Three or more 
categories per variable is a general rule of thumb and West et al (1995) recommend five or more.  
To minimize the bias resulting from categorical variables, all of our survey responses are 
measured using a five-point Likert-type scale.  Since we are interested mainly in the regression 
weights in the structural model (the coefficients on the variables that explain EMP adoption and 
P2 practices adoption), a potentially serious consequence of non-normality is that estimated 
standard errors are too low, particularly when there is a high degree of skewness or when the 
observed variables are each skewed to a different degree.  This means that test of significance 
will too often fail to reject insignificant parameters when using maximum likelihood estimation.  
To address this, we use nonparametric bootstrapping to generate significance levels for the 
parameter estimates.   Summary statistics showing the characteristics of the survey respondents 
are shown in Table 3.  
 
Empirical Framework 
We employ SEM to assess the factors and facility characteristics that motivate 
Implementation of EMPs and adoption of P2 practices by firms.  SEM is a technique for 
statistical analysis that estimates the parameters that describe the causal relationship between 
dependent and independent variables by minimizing the difference between the sample 
covariance matrix and the population covariance matrix formed with the dependent and 
independent variables.  Bollen (1989) describes SEM as a set of regression equations that invoke 
less restrictive assumptions and allows for errors in measurement of explanatory and dependent 
variables, as well as for errors in equations.  An SEM consists of two components: a   17
measurement model and a structural model.  These two components make up two sets of 
equations that are estimated simultaneously.   
The measurement model connects a latent variable of interest to one or more indicator 
variables using a linear function. Each indicator variable is a continuous variable that is 
represented as having two causes, a single underlying latent variable that is not directly observed 
but is a formal representation of  a concept and a measurement error.
11 These errors are assumed 
to be independent of each other and of the latent factors. The measurement model does not 
analyze associations between latent variables. The measurement model is similar to factor 
analysis used to reduce many indicator variables to a few latent factors.  
We perform the analysis in three steps.  First, we estimate the measurement model and 
assess reliability, consistency and validity of each of the latent variables.  Second, we assess the 
goodness of fit of the overall model to evaluate how closely our observed model fits the observed 
data.  Third, we estimate the two-equation structural model with the latent variables 
Implementation of EMPs and P2 Practices as dependent variables and with the seven latent 
factors and four observed characteristics of the facility as explanatory variables. 
 
Measurement Model 
   We first evaluate whether the latent variables we have constructed represent reasonable 
and identifiable distinct concepts.  To do this, we perform a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
and use the results to evaluate the measurement model based on three criteria: indicator 
reliability, internal consistency, and discriminant validity. The CFA estimates our unobserved 
latent variables as linear combinations of indicator variables. We use the indicator loadings (ie, 
                                                 
11 Measurement errors reflect two kinds of unique variance: (1) a random error and (2) a systematic variance due to 
things the indicator measures besides its underlying factor, such as the effects of a particular method of 
measurement.   18
regression coefficients) and error term variances from the regressions in the CFA to construct the 
statistics described below. 
  Indicator reliability is how well an observed indicator variable explains variation in the 
latent construct it is measuring. We tested indicator reliability by assessing the significance, sign, 
and strength of each indicator loading on to the hypothesized latent variable. The indicator 
loadings for each latent construct are reported in Tables 1 and 2.  Note that for each latent 
variable, the estimate of one indicator loading is set to 1.  This is because latent variables, being 
unobservable, have no natural scale.  All of these indicators loadings are significant at the 1 
percent level. We thus conclude that our measurement model has adequate indicator reliability.  
Next, we assessed the internal consistency of the observed indicator variables used to 
measure each latent construct using three different methods.
12  Internal consistency is the degree 
to which indicator variables that measure the same latent construct are correlated with each 
other.  We use three ways to check internal consistency for a latent variable: Cronbach’s alpha, 
composite reliability, and average variance extracted.  Results are presented in Table . 
The first check of internal consistency is Cronbach’s alpha.  As a general rule of thumb, 
Cronbach’s greater than 0.70 indicates that a latent variable exhibits adequate internal 
consistency (Kline 2005). The second check of internal consistency is composite reliability.  We 
calculated the composite reliability for each latent construct by dividing the squared sum of the 
standardized factor loadings by the variance of the error terms in the measurement equations plus 
the squared sum of the standardized factor loadings. Composite reliability greater than 0.70 
indicates the latent variable has adequate internal consistency (Delmas and Toffel 2005). The 
third check of internal consistency is average variance extracted, defined as the proportion of the 
                                                 
12 This concept is also commonly referred to as convergent validity and is based on the premise that the observed 
indicator variables should covary highly if they measure the same latent variable.  (see Bagozzi et al 1991 [p. 425], 
Kline 2005 [p. 60]).     19
variance in the indicators that is explained by the latent variable.
13  The total variance of the 
observed indicator variables is made up of an unexplained portion (the variance of the 
measurement errors) and an explained portion (the variance in the indicators that is due to the 
latent variable).  For an adequate measurement model, the average variance extracted should be 
greater than 0.50.  This would indicate that the variance explained by the latent variable is 
greater than the variance due to measurement error (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
  The results presented in Table 4 indicate that our hypothesized latent constructs have 
good internal consistency.  The composite reliability for each latent variable is above the 
accepted threshold of 0.70, except for Customer Pressure which is only slightly below.  The 
average variance extracted for all nine latent variables is well above the accepted threshold of 
0.50.  We conclude that our observed indicator variables do an adequate job of measuring the 
latent constructs of interest in to our study. 
Lastly, we tested for the discriminant validity, the degree to which measures of each of 
the latent variables are different.  If the hypothesized latent variables in the measurement model 
truly are distinct concepts, then the latent variables should not be highly correlated (Bagozzi et al 
1991). Following Delmas and Toffel (2005) we evaluate discriminant validity by comparing the 
shared variance between pairs of latent variables with the shared variance between the latent 
variables and their indicators.  We compute the shared variance between two latent variables by 
squaring the correlation between the two latent variables.  We compute the shared variance 
between the latent variables and their indicators as the average variance extracted (as described 
above).  Discriminant validity is adequate if the shared variance between two latent variables is 
less than the shared variance between the latent variables and their indicators. 
                                                 
13 Note that the part of the variance in the indicators that is due to the latent variable is the sum of the squared 
standardized factor loadings.  For each latent variable, the average variance extracted is calculated as the sum of the 
squared item standardized loadings divided by the sum of the variance of error terms and the squared item 
standardized loadings (Fornell and Larker 1981).   20
  Table 5 is a matrix that helps evaluate the degree of discriminant validity of our 
measurement model.  Elements on the diagonal are the square root of the average variance 
extracted for each latent variable. These elements represent the shared variance between 
indicator variables within the same latent variable.  Off-diagonal elements are the correlation 
between two latent variables. These elements represent the shared variance between distinct 
latent variables.  In a measurement model with a high degree of discriminant validity, diagonal 
elements will be greater than all other elements in the same row or column.  Put another way, 
this means that the indicator variables that make up any latent variable are more highly 
correlated with each other than is another latent variable with that latent variable.  The  results  in 
Table 5 show that our measurement model exhibits adequate discriminant validity because each 
diagonal element is greater than all other elements in its row and column.   
 
 
Structural Model  
   
  Our dataset contains missing values because many survey respondents did not provide an 
answer for every question.  Of the 689 surveys forms that were returned, 199 had responses for 
every question used in the present model. This means that 490 responses had missing values for 
at least one question.  We assume these missing values are missing at random and use the 
expectation maximization (EM) algorithm in SPSS to impute the missing values and generate a 
complete data set.
 14 Since our data set consists of categorical indicator variables that are non-
                                                 
14 The EM algorithm is an iterative, maximum likelihood based technique for imputing missing values.  Each 
iteration consists of two steps.  The first step (the expectation- or E-step) finds the expected values of the missing 
variables given the values for all of the non-missing values.  This is by accomplished by replacing each missing 
value with the predicted value from regressing the missing value on all remaining observed (non-missing) values.  
The second step (the maximization- or M-step) uses the newly completed data set to generate maximum likelihood 
estimates of the mean vector and covariance matrix.  The EM algorithm repeats until the difference between 
covariance matrices in subsequent iterations meets some convergence criteria.  More details on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the EM algoritm and alternative methods can be found in Enders (2001), Peters and Enders (2002), 
and Allison (2003). 
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normally distributed, we also obtain bootstrapped p-values to provide a better measure of the 
significance of the estimated parameters than one based on the maximum likelihood method. To 
examine if our results are sensitive to the method used to impute missing values, we also use the 
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) procedure in AMOS to obtain parameter 
estimates. The FIML estimation method does not impute missing values. Rather, parameters and 
standard errors are estimated directly using all of the observed data. In the course of the FIML 
procedure a likelihood function for each individual observation is estimated based on the (non-missing) 
variables (Enders 2001).  The drawback of this method is that we cannot bootstrap significance 
levels for the parameter estimates using AMOS and hence only the ML estimates are reported for 
this case. 
We estimated four different models to examine the determinants of EMP adoption and P2 
practices simultaneously as functions of the seven latent factors described above and facility 
characteristics. Model I includes only the latent constructs as explanatory variables while Model 
II also includes facility characteristics as explanatory variables. Model III expands Model II to 
include industry sector dummies to control for differences in EMPs or P2 practices across 
sectors. Models I-III allow for correlation in the error terms of the two dependent variables, 
Implementation of EMPs and P2 Practices.  Model IV does not allow for correlation across the 
error terms of the two dependent variables but instead hypothesizes that Implementation of EMPs 
have a direct effect on adoption of P2 Practices. 
We present the results of four models in Tables 6 and 7 below.  Table 6 presents the 
estimation results for our model explaining EMP adoption.  Table 7 presents estimation results 
for the model explaining adoption of practices. Note that these models are estimated 
simultaneously; the results are presented in separate tables to improve clarity of the presentation.     22
   All four models show that managerial attitudes have a statistically significant effect on 
the extent to which facilities implement EMPs and adopt P2 practices. We also find that facilities 
that perceived stronger investor pressures and were publicly owned were more likely to adopt 
EMPs. However, neither of these factors are important in explaining the adoption of P2 
practices. Infact, investor pressures had a negative but insignificant impact on the adoption of P2 
practices. We also find robust evidence that facilities that faced stronger regulatory pressures 
were more likely to adopt P2 practices. The impact of regulatory pressures on adoption of EMPs 
was positive but statistically significant in only the models using the EM imputed missing 
values. To the extent that the bootstrapped standard errors are more appropriate than the ML 
standard errors, we can conclude that regulatory pressures have an important influence on both 
Implementation of EMPs and adoption of P2 Practices. Furthermore, facilities that perceived 
stronger barriers to implementation of environmentally friendly production methods were less 
likely to adopt EMPs; this perception however did not have a statistically significant impact on 
adoption of P2 practices.     
As compared to the Construction sector (NAIC 236), facilities in the food (NAICS 311) 
and wood products (NAICS 321) appear to be more likely to adopt EMPs and P2 practices. 
However, facilities in the transportation sector (NAICS 484) were more likely to adopt EMPs 
while those in the Computer and Electronic Product Sector (NAICS 334) were more likely to 
adopt P2 practices compared to the Construction Sector.  
We do not find any evidence that perceived consumer pressures or interest group 
pressures played a role in motivating the Implementation of EMPs and adoption of P2 Practices. 
We also do not find larger facilities as being more likely to be environmentally proactive. There 
is some evidence that facilities with multinational status or facing stronger competitive pressures   23
were more likely to implement EMPs. These factors however had an insignificant impact on the 
P2 adoption decision.  
In Model IV we assume a recursive model while testing the hypothesis that facilities that 
adoption of EMPs was likely to lead to greater adoption of P2 practices. We find statistically 
significant support for this hypothesis using both the p-values from the EM imputed model and 
the FIML model. However, this result needs to be interpreted with caution because the 
assumption that the error term of the latent constructs representing EMP adoption and P2 
practice adoption are likely to be correlated. The positive effect of EMP adoption on P2 practices 
could then simply be picking up the effect of some unobserved variables that lead the facility to 
adopt more EMPs and P2 practices. 
  To assess the goodness of fit of the specified models with the observed data we report 
five measures of fit in Table 8 (see Kline, 2005). Lower values of the Model Chi-square (χ
2) 
indicate a better fit, however, its value increases with sample size and for non-normal 
distributions (Bollen, 1989; Shah and Goldstein, 2006). To correct for this, we divide the χ
2 by 
the degrees of freedom (df) in the model; a value less than 5 represents adequate fit (Bollen, 
1989). Lower values of the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) indicate better 
fit; a value less than 0.5 indicates close fit while a value between 0.05 and 0.08 indicates 
adequate fit and a value greater than 0.10 indicates unacceptable fit (Brown and Cudeck 1993). 
The values for the ratio of χ
2/df and the
 RMSEA, reported in Table 8, indicate an acceptable fit 
with Model III having the closest fit.  
 
Conclusions 
  Our empirical analysis sheds some light on the factors that can explain the different levels 
of greening of firms, as measured by their adoption of EMPs and/or P2 practices. In particular,   24
we find that perceived regulatory pressures have a statistically significant impact on the adoption 
of both EMPs and P2 practices. We also find that managerial attitudes, that capture a diverse set 
of beliefs ranging from a sense of moral responsibility towards the environment to the 
expectation that improvements in environmental performance will improve long term financial 
performance, have a strong influence on the decision to implement EMPs and adopt P2 practices. 
Other factors such as investor pressures and competitive pressures are significant in motivating 
firms to adopt the visible forms of greenness, namely adoption of EMPs, but not to invest in 
innovative pollution reduction technologies. Our results also show that perceptions matter; even 
firms with the same observed characteristics such as public ownership or multinational status can 
differ in their environmental behavior depending on their perceptions about investor or 
competitive pressure. We find no evidence that consumer or interest group pressures play any 
role in motivating environmental management.   
  This analysis has several implications for public policy. It suggests that simply relying on 
market forces to lead to corporate greening may not be enough. These forces may either not be 
strong enough or simply lead firms to make symbolic efforts at environmental management.  It is 
therefore important to have strict enforcement of existing regulation and a threat of stringent 
regulations in the future to motivate a change in corporate environmental behavior. Moreover, 
the expectation of tougher regulations in the future, even if they do not mandate specific 
technologies, can stimulate green technological innovation. It creates incentives for firms to find 
innovative and cost-effective approaches to improve environmental management. Finally, our 
findings suggest that public policy efforts for encouraging corporate environmental management 
should be targeted towards private, domestically oriented facilities that would otherwise have 
fewer incentives to do so. 
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Table 1: Construction of Latent Dependent Variables (with summary statistics) 
Latent 
Variable  Survey Question 





Environmental goals guide operational decisions 
(Q.12a) 2.88  1.2  631  0.926
Environmental responsibility is emphasized through 
well-defined environmental policies and procedures 
(Q.12b) 2.84  1.3  640  1.108
Our environmental standards are more stringent than 
mandatory governmental requirements (Q. 12c)  2.85  1.3  616  0.986
We conduct environmental audits for our own 
performance goals, not just for compliance (Q. 12d)  2.66  1.4  619  1.163
Employees receive incentives for contributions to 
environmental performance (Q. 12e)  1.91  1.0  634  0.682
We use environmental cost accounting (Q. 12f)  1.96  1.1  604  0.804
We make continuous efforts to minimize 
environmental impacts (Q. 12g)  3.7  1.2  642  0.852
We require our suppliers to pursue environmentally 
friendly practices (Q. 12h)  2.53  1.3  614  0.959
Employees are conscious of the importance of 
minimizing negative environmental impacts (Q.12i)  3.58  1.2  635  0.863
An adequate amount of training in environmental 




































Facility environmental achievements are given 
prominent coverage in facility annual reports (Q. 
12k) 2.16  1.2  602  1
Pollution prevention is emphasized to improve 
environmental performance (Q. 14a)  3.59  1.2  641  1.66
Efforts have been made to reduce spills and leaks of 
environmental contaminants (Q. 14b)  4.39  0.9  649  1.068
We choose raw materials that minimize 
environmental impacts (Q. 14c)  3.46  1.1  622  1.657
We have modified our production systems to reduce 
waste and environmental impacts (Q. 14d)  3.71  1.1  617  1.735
We have modified our production to reduce 
environmental damage during production, 
































We have increased recycling and reduce landfilling 
of our solid waste (Q. 14f)  4.21  1.0  642  1
*All indicator loadings were statistically significant at the 1% level 
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Table 2: Construction of Latent Explanatory Variables (with summary statistics) 
Latent Variable  Survey Question 





Complying with current government 
environmental regulations   4.1  1.2  661  1.000
Taking environmentally friendly actions to 
reduce regulatory inspections and make it 
easier to get environmental permits  3.21 1.5  634 
1.534
Being better prepared for meeting anticipated 
environmental regulations  3.29  1.4  644  1.459
Preempting future environmental regulations 
by voluntarily reducing regulated pollution 






























































Preempting future environmental regulations 
by voluntarily reducing unregulated impacts  2.68  1.4  618  1.526
Satisfying investor or owner desires to 
reduce environmental risks and liabilities   3.39  1.5  658  1.000
Protecting or enhancing the value of the 



















Satisfying lenders’ desires to reduce 
environmental risks and liabilities  2.39  1.4  617  .718
Customer desire for environmentally friendly 
products and services  2.85  1.4  654  1.000
Customer willingness to pay higher prices for 



















Ability to earn public recognition and 
customer goodwill with environmentally 
friendly actions  2.72  1.4  662 
.806
Environmental interest groups’ perception 
that environmental protection is a critical 
issue 2.26  1.3  647 
1.000
Preventing boycotts or other adverse actions 

























Promoting an environmentally friendly 
image to environmental interest groups  2.42  1.4  663  1.091
Investing in cleaner products and services 
differentiates our products or our facility  2.84  1.4  650  1.000
Improving environmental performance helps 






















Environmentally friendly actions result in 
product or process innovations  2.51  1.3  642  1.024  27
Environmentally friendly actions can reduce 
costs   2.96  1.4  645  .875
Being environmentally responsible attracts 
quality employees and reduces employee 
turnover   2.48  1.4  655 
.946
Being environmentally responsible improves 
employee morale, motivation and 
productivity   2.77  1.3  658 
.930
Moral responsibility to protect the 
environment   4.27  0.9  658  1.000
Support for protecting the environment even 
if substantial costs are incurred  3.42  1.2  653  1.388
Improvements in environmental performance 
will improve long-term financial 
performance 3.39  1.1  637 
1.401
Customers and other stakeholders care about 
the environmental impacts of its products  3.72  1.0  641  1.291
Advances in technology can solve 
environmental problems while increasing 
























































Facility should help conserve society's 
limited natural resources  4  1.0  642  1.048
High upfront investment expense  3.63  1.4  615  1.000
Availability of knowledgeable staff  2.77  1.2  621  .749
High day-to-day costs  3.29  1.3  605  1.059
Significant upfront time commitment  3.21  1.3  620  1.099



















































































































Risk of downtime of delivery interruptions 
during implementation  2.86  1.4  602  1.021
  Degrees of freedom        1091
  Number of estimated parameters        134
 Chi-square        4925.52
 Chi-square/df        4.52
 CFI        0.82
 RMR        0.086
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Facility revenues ($ Million)   16.8 
Retail 44.7 
Public Ownership  10.4 
Multinational Status  12.7 
Construction of Buildings (236)  19.6% 
 Food Manufacturing (311)  15.4% 
Wood Product Manufacturing (321)  17.3% 
Computer and Electronic Product 
Manufacturing (334)  7.4% 
Truck Transportation (484)  18.9% 
Accommodation (721)  20.5% 
 
Table 4: Measures of Internal Consistency 





Customer Pressure    0.695 0.584 
Interest Group Pressure  0.905 0.756 0.751 
Investor Pressure  0.892 0.694 0.601 
Regulatory Pressure  0.851 0.842 0.959 
Competitive Pressure  0.853 0.820 0.674 
Management Attitude  0.922 0.845 0.813 
Barriers to Implementation  0.821 0.802 0.619 
Implementation of EMPs   0.905 0.893 0.708 
P2 Practices  0.892 0.815 0.707 
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Pressure  0.764               
Interest 
Group 
Pressure  0.705  0.866             
Investor 
Pressure  0.519 0.561 0.775             
Regulatory 
Pressure  0.444 0.567 0.641  0.979          
Competitiv
e Pressure  0.726 0.668 0.616  0.603 0.821        
Managerial 
Attitude  0.486 0.482 0.583  0.456 0.706 0.902      
Barriers to 
Implement-
ation  0.146 0.127 0.201  0.175 0.132 -0.075 0.787     
Implementa
tion of 
EMPs   0.410 0.473 0.552  0.496 0.579 0.661 -0.088 0.841  
P2 
Practices  0.358 0.400 0.465  0.531 0.539 0.618 0.015 0.743 0.841
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p-values are in parentheses. For the models with EM imputed values, the first number in the parentheis is the ML p-
value and the second one is the bootstrapped p-value. For the FIML models, the ML p-value is reported. *** 
indicates statistically significant at the 1% level; ** indicates statistically significant at the 5% level and * indicates 
statistically significant at the 10% level. For the models using EM imputed missing values, the stars are assigned 
based on the bootstrap standard errors.    31





























































































































































































































p-values are in parentheses. For the models with EM imputed values, the first number in the parentheis is the ML p-
value and the second one is the bootstrapped p-value. For the FIML models, the ML p-value is reported. *** 
indicates statistically significant at the 1% level; ** indicates statistically significant at the 5% level and * indicates 
statistically significant at the 10% level. For the models using EM imputed missing values, the stars are assigned 
based on the bootstrap standard errors.   32
 



























freedom 1091  1251  1451  1451 1451  1451 
Number of 
estimated 
parameters 134  180  260  318  260 318 
Chi-square 4913.31  5289.13  5766.55  4661.551  5766.554  4661.551
Chi-
square/df 4.50  4.23  3.97  3.21  3.97  3.21 
RMSEA 0.071  0.068  0.066  0.057 0.066  0.057 
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